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Abstract
In this paper we design a protocol to extract random bits with an arbitrarily low bias from a
single arbitrarily weak min-entropy block source in a device independent setting. The protocol
employs Mermin devices that exhibit super-classical correlations. Number of devices used scales
polynomially in the length of the block n, containing entropy of at least two bits. Our protocol
is robust, it can tolerate devices that malfunction with a probability dropping polynomially in n
at the cost of constant increase of the number of devices used.
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1 Introduction
High quality randomness is a very useful resource in many computation and cryptographic
tasks. In fact it has been shown that many protocols, including quantum ones, vitally require
perfect randomness for their security [1, 2].
Unfortunately, even though we cannot fully predict certain processes it is very difficult to
argue that they produce perfect randomness – independent and unbiased bits. The problem
of imperfect randomness has a long history in classical computer science and long line of
research was devoted to randomness extraction – algorithms to transform imperfect sources
of randomness into (close to) perfect ones [3].
The drawback of randomness extractors are twofold. Firstly, extractors typically require
at least two independent sources of (imperfect) randomness. Worse still, even imperfect
randomness of classical processes has to be assumed, because in principle classical physics is
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deterministic. Quantum physics, with its intrinsic randomness allows us, in theory, to drop the
second assumption. Preparation of a pure state and measurement in its complementary basis
will yield a perfectly random result. In practice, however, we are replacing the assumption of
randomness by yet another assumption – perfect control of quantum devices. This assumption
is also very problematic, as we have learned in case of quantum key distribution [4].
Luckily enough, thanks to Bell-type experiments, it is possible to certify by classical
procedures that quantum processes are being observed and therefore intrinsic randomness is
being produced. This is the basic idea behind device independent randomness extraction.
Effectively, we are exchanging the assumption of independent randomness of the second
source by a much weaker assumption – validity of quantum mechanics. Alternatively, one
can view device-independent randomness extraction as quantum protocol for extracting
randomness from a single weak source – a task that is classically impossible.
In this paper we work with (n, k)block min-entropy random sources. These are sources
with n-bit blocks of output with guaranteed min-entropy k. Such a source can be modeled
as a sequence of n-bit random variables X1, X2, . . . , such that
∀x1, . . . , xi−1 ∈ {0, 1}n,∀e ∈ I(E), (1)
H∞(Xi|Xi−1 = xi−1, . . . , X1 = x1, E = e) ≥ k,
where E is a random variable describing all adversary’s information about the source and
I(E) is it’s image. Therefore, each new block has high min-entropy, even conditioned
on the previous ones and any information of the adversary. This is a generalization of
Santha-Vazirani sources [5], which can be viewed as block sources with n = 1.
Note that the task of transforming a single block source into a fully random bit is known
to be impossible [3]. Furthermore, it is impossible to turn a block source with n > 1 into
Santha-Vazirani source, therefore we cannot use existing randomness extraction protocols
[6, 7, 8, 9].
It is also worth to note that similar results were independently obtained by Chung, Shi
and Wu [10]. The main difference between the two results is that we work with min-entropy
block sources, while their results hold also for general min-entropy sources.
2 Device Independent Concept and Mermin Inequality
In this paper we use the three-partite Mermin inequality. Let’s consider three non–communicating
boxes, each of them having a single bit input and a single bit output. Let us denote the
input bits of the respective boxes by X, Y and Z and the corresponding output bits A, B
and C. Input bits are correlated and it holds that XY Z ∈ {111, 100, 010, 001}. The inputs
are simultaneously passed to all boxes, so each box only knows it’s input. The value v of the
Mermin term is a function of the 4 conditional probabilities defined by the behavior of the
device and of the probability distribution on inputs
v =P (A⊕B ⊕ C = 1|XY Z = 111)P (XY Z = 111)+
+P (A⊕B ⊕ C = 0|XY Z = 100)P (XY Z = 100)+
+P (A⊕B ⊕ C = 0|XY Z = 010)P (XY Z = 010)+
+P (A⊕B ⊕ C = 0|XY Z = 001)P (XY Z = 001). (2)
In particular, for the uniform input distribution we set P (XY Z = 111) = P (XY Z = 010) =
P (XY Z = 001) = P (XY Z = 100) = 14 and denote the Mermin term by vu.
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Figure 1 Depicted is the value of Mermin variable v = f(ε) needed to certify the bias of the
output bit to be at most ε.
Assuming the uniform distribution on all four inputs, the maximal value of vu achievable
by a classical device [11] is 34 (thus the Mermin inequality reads vu ≤ 34 ) and there exists
a classical device that can make any 3 conditional probabilities simultaneously equal to
1. With the use of quantum mechanics we can achieve vu = 1 and satisfy perfectly all 4
conditional probabilities using the tripartite GHZ state 1√2 (|000〉+ |111〉) and measuring σX
(σY ) when receiving 0 (1) on input.
The beautiful property of the Mermin inequality is that the violation v gives us directly
the probability that the device passes a specific test
A+B + C = X · Y · Z, (3)
where addition and product are both taken modulo 2. The probability of failing the test is
therefore 1− v.
Mironowicz and Pawlowski [9] showed the following result: Take a linearly ordered
sequence of ` Mermin devices D1 . . . D` (` being arbitrary) that have uniform distribution
on inputs, and each device knows inputs and outputs of its predecessors, but devices cannot
signal to its predecessors. Let us assume that the inputs of devices are described by random
variables XY Z1, . . . , XY Z`, and the outputs by ABC1, . . . , ABC`. Then there exists a
function f(ε) such that if the value of the Mermin term (2) using uniform inputs is at least
vu ≥ f(ε), then the output bit A` has a bias at most ε conditioned on the input and output
of all its predecessors and the adversarial knowledge. This function can be lower bounded by
a Semi-Definite Program (SDP) using any level of the hierarchy introduced in [12]. By using
the second level of the hierarchy one can obtain the bound on f(ε) as a function of ε shown
in Fig. 1.
We can set ` = 1 (having just a single device) and get the lower bound on the detection
probability of producing a bit biased by more than ε, which is greater than 1− f(ε). Our
protocol uses many devices, which are forbidden to communicate at all, therefore they can
be ordered arbitrarily and thus this limit holds for all of these devices simultaneously.
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3 Single-round protocol
In the rest of our analysis we will be working with (n, k) block sources for an arbitrary n
and k ≥ 2. This is to simplify the explanation, since by taking d 2k′ e blocks of an arbitrary
(n′, k′) source with k′ > 0 we get a (n, k) source with n = d 2k′ en′ and k = d 2k′ ek′ ≥ 2.
Let us start with a min-entropy (n, 2) source (recall that (n, k) source with k > 2 is also
an (n, 2) source) and define N = 2n. Let H = {h1,
dots, hm} be a family of hash functions s.t. hi : {0, . . . , N − 1} → {0, 1, 2, 3}. Each hash-
function hi is used to provide input for a Mermin-type device Di, where outputs of the
function 0, 1, 2, 3 identify 111, 100, 010, 001 inputs for the device.
We want to construct H with the property that for every 4-element set S ⊆ {0, . . . , N−1}
there exist at least one hash function h ∈ H such that h(S) = {0, 1, 2, 3}. This is trivially
satisfied for the set of all possible hashing functions Hfull = {0, 1, 2, 3}N , however, such a
class of functions with its 4N elements is impractically large. There exists a construction of
such class of hash functions with logarithmic number of functions in N (see [13]), thus the
number of devices needed scales polynomially with the length of the sequence n. We also
stress that for large n one hash function covers as many as 9% of all four-tuples, independently
on n. So the size of an optimal set of hash functions might not depend on n at all. Let us
denote m = |H|. The protocol works as follows:
1. Obtain a (weakly) random n bit string r from the (n, k) block source.
2. Into each device Di input the 3 bit string ri chosen from set {111, 100, 010, 001} – each
one corresponding to one of the possible outputs of hi(r) – and obtain the outputs Ai,
Bi and Ci.
3. Verify whether for each device Di the condition Xi + Yi + Zi = Ai ·Bi · Ci holds. If this
is not true, abort the protocol.
4. Output b =
⊕m
i=1Ai.
The protocol is depicted in the Fig. 2.
Let us now examine the properties of the bit bi. First consider only flat (n, 2) distributions.
Recall that these are exactly distributions that are uniform on 4-element subsets of the
sample space. Our construction of the class H of hash functions assures that for any flat
probability distribution there is a function hj ∈ H and the corresponding device Dj such
that inputs of Dj (hashed by hj) are uniform. Although output bits Ai are not independent
in general, as most of them can be produced by fully deterministic strategies, (1) together
with the arbitrary ordering we can impose on devices {Di}mi=1 we have that if the adversary
wants to bias (conditioned on the inputs and outputs of other devices) Aj by amount greater
than ε, she must risk getting caught with probability at least 1 − f(ε). Therefore Aj is
partially independent of other {Ai|i 6= j}, and the output of the round b is biased by at most
ε with probability at least 1− f(ε).
The set of all (n, 2) distributions is convex and flat distributions are exactly all extremal
points of this convex set [14]. Thus any (n, 2) distribution d can be expressed as a convex
combination of at mostN (n, 2) flat distributions di (Caratheodory theorem) as d =
∑N
i=1 pidi
for some pi ≥ 0,
∑N
i=1 pi = 1. The lower bound on probability that the adversary is
not detected is given by the successful cheating probabilities when using flat distribution
di ∈ {di}Ni=1 averaged through the probability distribution on these flat distributions
vu ≤
N∑
i=1
piP (not detected|di) ≤ f(ε)
∑N
i=1 pi . (4)
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Figure 2 Depiction of a single round protocol. Bit string drawn from the flat random source
is hashed into m inputs into Mermin devices so that at least one device receives all four inputs
with non-zero probability. This guarantees at least one result almost perfectly random with high
probability, which holds also for the product of individual results.
Thus the upper bound vu ≤ f(ε) holds for non-flat distributions as well.
To summarize this part, having an (n, k) source with k ≥ 2, with a single round of a
protocol, we can produce a single bit that is biased at most by ε with a certainty of 1− f(ε).
4 Multiple-round protocol
Let us state the most general task: we have an (n, k) block source with arbitrary n and
k ≥ 2. We would like to produce a bit that is biased by no more than ε with certainty of at
least 1− δ.
If the one-round version does not meet these parameters, we will repeat the whole protocol
l times. By using new devices and new outputs of the block source, each of the runs j will
produce a bit bj that is biased by ε from perfectly random bit conditioned on all the previous
bits {bi|i < j} up to a probability f(ε). Thus, in order to achieve the bias of the output bit
b =
l⊕
j=1
bj (5)
of at least ε, all bits bi has to have at least this bias. Therefore, after l rounds, the probability
of the adversary not being detected will be upper bounded by f(ε)l. Note that the product
form does not come from the fact that the detection probabilities are independent (they
are not). This is a product of a chain of conditional probabilities. Recall that the bound
f(ε) holds conditioned on any inputs and outputs of the previous devices (in an arbitrarily
ordering that respects the causality). Thus choosing
l >
log δ
log f(ε) (6)
will guarantee the fulfillment of the conditions for the parameters ε and δ.
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Summing up, with an (n, k) block source and
O
(
log δ
log f(ε)Poly
[
n
⌈
2
k
⌉])
(7)
Mermin devices we can produce a single random bit with bias smaller than ε with probability
larger than 1− δ. For producing more bits we simply repeat the whole procedure: all the
bits produced will have bias smaller than ε conditioned on the bits produced so far, with
linear scaling of the resources.
5 Robustness
Aborting the protocol after even a single mistake of the devices is certainly highly impractical
from the implementation point of view. Therefore we expand our analysis to a situation
where we tolerate certain noise on the devices, which would manifest itself by occasional
failing of the test condition even for honest devices. More specifically, we shall tolerate a
certain fraction of the devices to malfunction without aborting the protocol.
In more technical version of this work [13] we show, that if we tolerate
(1− f(ε))
2 l (8)
devices to fail in the whole protocol and want to achieve security parameters ε, δ we can do
so by increasing
l >
8 ln δ
f(ε)− 1 . (9)
This translates into increasing the number of rounds of the protocol comparing to the case
of ideal devices by a factor of 8 ln(f(ε))f(ε)−1 . For small ε the parameter f(ε) approaches 1 and the
multiplication factor saturates by 8.
On the other hand we also show that for honest but faulty devices with individual failure
probability bounded by
(1− f(ε))
4m , (10)
the probability of aborting the protocol decreases exponentially with the number of protocol
rounds l.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a protocol that extracts weak randomness obtained from
a min-entropy source in the device independent setting. The protocol works for arbitrarily
weak block min-entropy sources with a reasonable scaling of the number of devices. Our
protocol is also robust, as it allows tolerating some fraction of malfunctioning devices at the
cost of a constant increase of the number of devices used.
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